In Parkinson’s disease, there is insufficient dopamine in parts
of the brain. This chemical can be replaced in pill form, but with variable
effect, and with some side effects. In the 1990’s many clinics were transplanting
dopamine-producing cells from embryos into the brains of people with Parkinson’s
disease. This procedure involved drilling holes in the skull, through which the
cells were inserted. Animal studies showed that the cells could survive, and that
the procedure could correct some of the movement disorders. Open label trials (no placebo) of these
transplants in humans showed that patients improved. This is the same evidence
base for many operations performed today: a biological mechanism, supportive lab
studies, and reports of patients that got better. Enter, the sham.
I had read about these trials, but had not read the articles
themselves. When I was searching for them, I found more articles written about
the ethics of these trials than actual trials published. The highest profile
articles were firstly from the authors of one of the trials defending their use
of sham surgery (here), and
the following article against its use (here).
After some searching, I found the actual trial that they were talking about (here) from 2003, and an
earlier trial from 2001(here).
The trials
In the 2001 trial from the New England Journal of Medicine 20
patients were randomised to each group (fetal cells and sham surgery). The
results for the primary outcome (the Global Rating Scale) were very similar
between the two groups, with basically no improvement in either group. This is
interesting, because my previous post on sham angina surgery showed that both groups improved, but by a similar
amount. Now, given that they found no difference between the groups in their
primary outcome, even when dividing them into young and old, why does the
conclusion in their summary state: “Human
embryonic dopamine-neuron transplants … result in some clinical benefit in
younger but not in older patients”?
Because amongst their numerous sub group analyses of
different outcomes for different genders and different age groups, they found
(wait for it) that for some outcomes, in younger patients, when tested in the
morning, before their medication, the transplant group did better than the sham
group. Since when does a subgroup analysis like that trump the primary outcome
on which the study (and the hypothesis) is based? And while they were keen to
include all the p values (significance tests) for each subgroup, they didn’t do
any significance testing on the finding that major adverse events occurred in
42% of the transplant group compared to 5% in the sham group. I did, and the p
value (probability of arising by chance) for that is 0.006.
The quality of life outcomes for the same patients (reported
in a separate study here),
showed no significant difference between the surgery and the sham groups, and
here both groups did improve. Interestingly, patients who thought they got the active treatment did significantly better than
those who thought they got the sham,
regardless of what they actually
received (and yes, their guesses were no better than chance, which shows that
the study was well blinded). If just thinking they got the treatment made them
better, how much improvement would there be if patients knew they got the treatment (like when
we report case series)?
The 2003 trial of 31 patients in three groups was published
in the Annals of Neurology. Except for a few minor differences (general
anaesthetic instead of local, and the addition of immunosuppression) they
basically tested the same thing, right down to the sham surgery. The active
group did a little better than the sham group, but the difference was not statistically
significant. Inevitably, they found a sub group where the transplant fared
better than the sham (ironically, it was the mild cases) but at least they had
the scientific merit to correctly conclude that: “Fetal nigral transplantation currently
cannot be recommended as a therapy for Parkinson’s disease based on these
results”.
Questioning the
biological plausibility (mechanism)
Like a lot of these things, they sound good superficially,
but when you think about them for a while, they don’t. To me, putting dopamine
producing cells into the brains of people with Parkinson’s makes as much sense
as injecting bone cells into people with osteoporosis. It is similar to stem
cell therapy, where the attraction lies in the theory, not the results (see
previous blog: Stem
cell therapy: still science fiction). To think that we can correct the vast
complexities involved in a disease that we do not fully understand by injecting
some cells from an embryo is a probably little naïve.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.